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Arbitrating in Thailand
By JAHAN P. RAISSI*
Member of the Class of 1993
Thailand is a Southeast Asian nation approximately the size of
Texas with a population of fifty-seven million people.' It is bounded by
the Gulf of Thailand and Malaysia to the south, Burma to the west and
northwest, Laos to the north and northeast, and Cambodia to the south-
east. Thailand is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN), a regional trading block which also includes Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Brunei.2 Bangkok is Thai-
land's capital and center of economic activity.
Thailand has one of the developing world's strongest economies.3
Between 1987 and 1990 the annual economic growth rate exceeded
eleven percent.4 This growth was fueled largely by direct foreign invest-
ment in export-oriented industries.5 The manufacturing sector in partic-
ular experienced tremendous growth.6 The Thai governmen't's seventh
five-year plan, covering 1992 through 1996, seeks sustainable growth of
nine percent annually.7 The United States State Department predicts,
"Thailand's economy will continue on its path of rapid growth and in-
dustrialization." 8 This economic development and the potential for fu-
ture growth attract greater foreign investment in export industries. It
* B.A., University of California, Santa Cruz 1990
1. BuREAu OF PUBLIC AFFAiRs, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PuB. No. 7961, BACKGROUND
NoTEs: THAiLAND 1 (Phyllis A. Young ed., 1991) [hereinafter Background Notes].
2. ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand. Brunei joined the Association in 1984. ASEAN was formed to facilitate the devel-
opment of the member nations primarily through inter-member tariff reductions. However,
competitiveness between the member nations has impaired their willingness to meaningfully
cooperate with each other, thereby inhibiting the effectiveness of tariff reductions and the As-
sociation generally. Id. at 4.
3. Id. at 3.
4. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., THAILAND:
THE CONSTRAINTS OF SuccEss 3 (Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter House Report].
5. Id. at 12.
6. Background Notes, supra note 1, at 4.
7. House Report, supra note 4, at 3.
8. Background Notes, supra note 1, at 4.
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also lures investment by foreign suppliers and manufacturers of con-
sumer goods for Thailand's growing domestic market.
As the growth of foreign investment in Thailand continues, disputes
between foreign enterprises and their Thai counterparts inevitably arise.
In an effort to abate foreign businesses' reluctance to trust the Thai legal
system and the Thais' disinclination to submit to international arbitra-
tion, Thailand recently opened an Arbitration Office in the Ministry of
Justice. The Arbitration Office provides foreign businesses a means of
resolving disputes outside the confines of the Thai legal system. The Of-
fice also provides Thais an alternative to arbitrating in a foreign country. 9
This Note will examine the following: (1) common considerations
involved with arbitration and agreements to arbitrate; (2) the Thai legal
system and reasons why a foreign investor may wish to resolve disputes
outside that system; (3) Thailand's 1987 Arbitration Act, the 1990 Arbi-
tration Rules promulgated by the Arbitration Institute, and the 1990
Conciliation Rules also promulgated by the Arbitration Institute; (4) en-
forcement of arbitral awards; and (5) the Working of Aliens Act, which
prohibits the involvement of non-Thais in the arbitration process. Fi-
nally, the note concludes that due to Thailand's arbitration rules, many
potential advantages of arbitration are lost, making arbitration in Thai-
land only marginally more attractive to the foreign investor than litigat-
ing in the Thai national courts.
I. ARBITRATION
Arbitration is a method of dispute resolution in which an agreement
between the disputing parties vests the power to decide the conflict in one
or more third persons.10 It is a contract-based substitute for court-super-
vised litigation. True arbitration produces a decision which binds the
parties and carries the legal effect of a final court judgment. II Parties
may agree to arbitrate after a dispute arises. However, an arbitration
agreement is most effective if the parties contemplate an arbitration
clause alongside other negotiable terms of a commercial agreement and
include the arbitration clause in the original written agreement.12 An
arbitration agreement generally must be in writing and be sufficiently
9. For example, many foreign businesses will attempt to conduct arbitration proceedings
in neutral forums such as Geneva.
10. Henry P. de Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute
for National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REv. 42, 43 (1982).
11. Id. at 47.
12. Gerald Aksen, Arbitration and Other Means of Dispute Settlement, in JOINT VENTUR-
ING ABROAD 287, 287 (David N. Goldsweig ed., 1985).
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broad to cover all disputes potentially arising under the parties'
agreement.13
A. Advantages of Arbitration
Dispute resolution by arbitration incorporates various attractive fea-
tures. Arbitration's most notable feature is flexibility. 4 In an arbitration
agreement the parties are generally free to negotiate the applicable proce-
dures, venue, and substantive law which will govern dispute resolution. 5
Furthermore, flexible arbitration procedures provide the parties the free-
dom to choose the judges who will decide their dispute. 6 Another im-
portant feature of arbitration is that generally the grounds upon which a
court may vacate or refuse enforcement of an arbitral award pursuant to
a valid arbitration agreement are narrow and few."7 Thus, arbitration
provides a non-judicial mechanism for conflict resolution sufficiently flex-
ible to suit particular needs or circumstances, yet it carries the force of a
binding judicial decision, generally without the time, expense, and uncer-
tainty of an appeal.
Arbitration allows both parties a middle ground where disputes are
removed from either side's "home court" with its attendant substantive
and procedural rules. Often, when the possibility of a dispute is consid-
ered before entering an international commercial agreement, neither
party willingly accepts dispute resolution in the other party's native court
system.'" Since international contracts cross not only geographical
bounds, but cultural and linguistic as well, parties often believe they will
be disadvantaged in the other party's courts due to national bias or sim-
ply because of their unfamiliarity with the procedural and substantive
law of the foreign court: "Whether right or wrong, each party feels the
submission of disputes to the other's local courts will give the 'home
court' party an unfair advantage, either substantively, procedurally, or
psychologically."' 9 Arbitration resolves the national bias problem by re-
13. Id. at 289.
14. Steven C. Nelson, Alternatives to Litigation of International Disputes, 23 INT'L LAW.
187, 197 (1989).
15. The extent of the parties' freedom to structure dispute resolution depends on the pre-
vailing law in the jurisdiction where arbitration is sought, the rules of the arbitration associa-
tion chosen (if any), and the law of the jurisdiction where enforcement will likely be sought.
De Vries, supra note 10, at 50.
16. Id at 69.
17. Id. at 52. A broad agreement is therefore necessary to foreclose the possibility of an
attack on the agreement itself.
18. Aksen, supra note 12, at 287.
19. Id.
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laxing both procedural and substantive law. Procedure can be stream-
lined, or left to the arbitrator's discretion, to create an informal
proceeding where lawyers are unnecessary. By minimizing delays and
discarding rigid procedural rules, dispute resolution occurs more
quickly.2" By agreeing beforehand to a choice of law provision regarding
which substantive rules will govern, the parties lend certainty and pre-
dictability to their agreement, and avoid unfavorable substantive law.21
For example, Thailand is a civil law country22 and court proceedings are
conducted in Thai. A common law lawyer with a client who wishes to
enter a simple agreement in Thailand would find it difficult to advise the
client regarding the appropriate contract clauses to include, their exact
ramifications, or the likely outcome of a dispute. Entering an arbitration
agreement in which the parties agree to the specific substantive rules
lends a greater degree of predictability and certainty for a foreign party
unfamiliar with Thai substantive law. Even if arbitration in a neutral
third country is impossible, the ability to appoint arbitrators from a neu-
tral third country helps placate the fear of national bias.
Another advantage of arbitration is that its flexibility and informal
nature help preserve the underlying commercial relationship: "If busi-
ness people withdraw from the dispute resolution process and leave their
lawyers to engage in a 'win-lose' contest, damage to the commercial rela-
tionship is likely."23 Indeed, a pre-arr.anged resolution procedure in a
contract may allow the parties to reach a business solution without actu-
ally resorting to formal procedure. 24 Even if the parties invoke the for-
mal mechanism, arbitration's non-judicial aspects, such as the ability to
appoint business peers as arbitrators, lessen the proceeding's confronta-
tional and adversarial nature. Thus business people are more likely to
avoid the animosities which make further commercial dealings
impossible.2"
Arbitration is only as good as the arbitrators who administer it.26
20. It should be emphasized that speedier settlement is possible but by no means a given.
It depends on the arbitration procedures used in relation to the speed of the national courts. If
the parties arbitrate in a third country, the potential for a process more lengthy than litigation
is increased. De Vries, supra note 10, at 61.
21. Attempting to circumvent a nation's substantive law or acting contrary to a public
policy, however, may be grounds for vacating an arbitral award. For a discussion of vacating
an award in Thailand, see infra text accompanying notes 121-26.
22. Chaiyos Hemarajata, The Principles of Contracts in Thailand, in THE LEGAL SYSTEM
OF THAILAND 49, 49 (Organizing Comm. for the Seventh LawAsia Conference 1981).
23. Nelson, supra note 14, at 198.
24. Aksen, supra note 12, at 287.
25. De Vries, supra note 10, at 43.
26. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW,
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Moreover, it has been noted that, "[t]he organization and composition of
the arbitral tribunal is the most important element in the arbitral pro-
cess." 27 The parties' ability to control the tribunal's organization and
composition by appointing their own arbitrators is a great potential ad-
vantage. By controlling the selection of arbitrators, the parties may fash-
ion a tribunal as impartial, as familiar with the particular business
practices, or as sympathetic to a particular position28 as they desire.
Arbitrators, more than judges, are singularly concerned with the eq-
uities between the parties because they "have no public policies extrinsic
to the agreement of the parties that they must enforce."29 National
judges, on the other hand, must consider national policy goals when ren-
dering their decisions. This is an advantage of arbitration for the foreign
party because policy arguments and considerations are difficult for a for-
eigner to grasp. In many countries this difficulty in understanding is
compounded by the fact that policy arguments and considerations often
change. By removing policy-based claims and defenses, the agreement
becomes more predictable because conflict resolution is based primarily
on the equities of the case and business custom.
In the international arena, arbitral awards enjoy a distinct advan-
tage in enforcement over court judgments. The United States Constitu-
tion's "full faith and credit" clause does not guarantee enforcement in
the United States of judgments rendered by foreign courts."0 Similarly,
foreign courts do not automatically honor judgments of American
courts.31 Paradoxically, arbitral awards rendered in one country are en-
forced by international treaty in foreign countries, while court judgments
are not.
The 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, commonly known as the New
York Convention,3 2 is the most important treaty for enforcing foreign
arbitration awards because of both the number of nations who are parties
to the agreement and the breadth of its provisions. The New York Con-
THE 1989 GUIDi TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND ARBITRAToRs vii (1989) [hereinaf-
ter The 1989 Guide].
27. De Vries, supra note 10, at 69.
28. Since both parties generally have an equal say in the selection, it is unlikely that any
party could "pack" the tribunal in its favor. Also, conflict of interest or bias is generally
recognized as one of the few grounds for overturning an arbitral award.
29. Nelson, supra note 14, at 195 (citing Francis J. Higgins et al., Pitfalls in International
Commercial Arbitration, 35 Bus. LAW 1035-40 (1980)).
30. Id. at 191.
31. Id.
32. De Vries, supra note 10, at 56.
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vention requires each member state to recognize written arbitration
agreements.33 It further requires each member's courts to refer parties to
arbitration where an arbitration agreement governs the dispute before the
court, and one party requests arbitration.34 Most importantly, Article
III requires each member state to recognize arbitral awards rendered in
other member states.35 "An award made in the territory of a member
state other than the state in which enforcement is sought must, subject to
limited grounds for review, be enforced in the latter state following com-
pliance with the simple procedure of furnishing its courts with a trans-
lated copy of the award."' 36 Thus, a party who obtains an arbitral award
in a member state may seek enforcement in any member state where the
other party's assets lie. Presently, over eighty nations have signed, rati-
fied, or acceded to the New York Convention.37
An arbitration agreement also minimizes the risk that parties will
simultaneously initiate proceedings in several jurisdictions resulting in
inconsistent outcomes.38 The agreement establishes the mechanism, and
often the forum, for dispute resolution, thus minimizing the chance of
duplicative litigation arising in different forums.
B. Potential Drawbacks to Arbitration
Arbitration's advantages to a foreign investor may depend on where
the contract is executed or the citizenship of the other party. When an
American party enters a contract in England with a British party, the
shared common-law tradition, language, and culture reduce concerns re-
garding unfamiliarity with the law and legal system, national bias, or
enforceability. These concerns are far more pressing, however, when the
parties are American and Thai. Although the reasons to arbitrate are
perhaps less compelling for the American and British parties, other at-
tributes, such as informality and speedy resolution, still favor arbitration.
In deciding whether to arbitrate, the parties should consider the
complexity of the commercial relationship they are entering. Arbitration
is ideal for relatively uncomplicated two party disputes, not multi-party
proceedings. Moreover, because the power to arbitrate springs from an
agreement between the parties, third parties necessary or proper for com-
33. Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, art. II, § 1, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
34. Id., art. II, § 3.
35. Id., art. III.
36. De Vries, supra note 10, at 58.
37. The 1989 Guide, supra note 26, at 437-39.
38. Nelson, supra note 14, at 193.
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plete resolution of the dispute, who are not parties to the arbitration
agreement, are not bound by the arbitration. Thus, in complex commer-
cial transactions the procedural formality of a court may be more appro-
priate, indeed necessary, for a just resolution.39
The parties should also consider cost. The government bears most
of the national courts' costs, while the parties in arbitration must pay
their own advocates, the arbitration center's costs, and the arbitrator's
fees. The daily cost of arbitration may outweigh court litigation ex-
penses, but arbitration may take less time. Furthermore, the parties may
specify in the arbitration agreement how to allocate costs.
C. Summary
Arbitration has distinct advantages as well as drawbacks. In consid-
ering arbitration, much depends upon the particular circumstances sur-
rounding the contract negotiations. Of course, much also depends on
what is mutually agreeable, rather than what is optimally desirable. A
related consideration concerns the amount of negotiating effort parties
are willing to expend for a favorable arbitration agreement. Depending
on the situation, it may be that the commercial terms of an agreement are
so important that an arbitration agreement is only a secondary considera-
tion and not worth the effort required to conclude an optimally favorable
arbitration agreement. The inclusion of an arbitration agreement in a
commercial contract should never be a blanket policy. 4° Parties should
enter an arbitration agreement only after analyzing and weighing the var-
ious factors discussed above.
II. THE THAI LEGAL SYSTEM
Thailand has a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary sys-
tem of democracy.41 It is the only country in South and Southeast Asia
never to have been colonized by a Western nation.42 Although its legal
system follows the civil law tradition,43 because it was adopted by the
Thais and not imposed upon them, it blends principles of traditional Thai
law with Western law.' As a civil law system, the substance of the law
39. Id. at 200-01. Of course, this depends on the court practices which prevail in the
jurisdiction where court action would be an alternative.
40. De Vries, supra note 10, at 79.
41. Surakiart Sathirathai & Borwornsak Uwanno, Introduction to the Thai Legal System,
4 CHULALONGKORN L. Rnv. 39, 45-46 (1985-86).
42. Background Notes, supra note 1, at 3.
43. Hemarajata, supra note 22, at 49.
44. Background Notes, supra note 1, at 3.
19921
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
is mainly composed of generally phrased codes. Also, unlike the com-
mon law system, judicial decisions are not a source of binding precedent
or law. Therefore, the Thai legal system may be something of a mystery
to many common law lawyers.
A. Structure of the Thai Legal System
Thailand's judicial system is divided into three tiers: Courts of First
Instance, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court.45 The Courts of
First Instance, which hold original jurisdiction of commercial matters,
are further subdivided territorially between the Bangkok Metropolis and
the provinces.46 The only Court of Appeal is in Bangkok.4 The
Supreme Court, also located in Bangkok, is the final court of appeal.4"
Judicial proceedings are conducted in Thai.
B. Sources of Thai Law
The substance of Thai law derives from several sources, such as the
Civil and Commercial Code, the Constitution, legislative enactments, ex-
ecutive regulations, and even custom. Probably the most important
sources are the Codes, as most commercial matters are governed by
them.
1. Civil and Commercial Code
The Thai Civil and Commercial Codes, adopted in 1935, with an
English translation alongside the Thai, contain the general provisions
governing contracts and commercial dealings.4 9 The Civil and Commer-
cial Codes also include "general principles," which are principles of law
applicable to the interpretation and elucidation of all Thai law.5" The
Codes, however, "tend to be statements of law so generally [phrased] as
to provide only a foundation of basic doctrine, on which scholars and
judges must build the specific requisite to the solution of legal
problems."51
2. Acts and Subordinate Legislation
With Parliament's recommendation and consent, the King may pass
45. THAILAND MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THAILAND 2 (n.d.).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 11.
48. Id. at 12.
49. Sathirathai & Uwanno, supra note 41, at 46.
50. Id.
51. Hemarajata, supra note 22, at 49.
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acts which have the force of law but which are not codes.52 Before such
acts are effective, they must be published in the government gazette. 3
All Thai public economic and social laws are in this form.'
The executive branch also issues subordinate legislation such as
royal decrees, ministerial regulations, and other by-laws; however, an
Act of Parliament must first delegate authority to the executive branch to
promulgate specific subordinate legislation." Subordinate legislation is
analogous to United States administrative regulations and is an increas-
ingly important source of law, presently numbering over 50,000 pieces of
legislation.56
3. The Thai Constitution
Thailand's Contitution is only slightly relevant to commercial deal-
ings because, while in theory the Constitution is the supreme law of the
land,57 since 1932 Thailand has enacted thirteen constitutions.5" Thai
constitutions are rather rigid and difficult for interest groups to amend.
As a result, the most popular form of constitutional amendment is a coup
d'etat, which occurs with alarming regularity.59 The most recent oc-
curred February 23, 1991, when a military takeover abolished the Con-
stitution and disbanded Parliament.60 The regularity of this form of
constitutional "amendment" seriously undermines the Constitution as a
viable source of stable and supreme law.
61
4. Custom and "General Principles"
Custom is another source of Thai law. Book I, section 4 of the Thai
Civil and Commercial Code establishes "local custom" as law where no
specific provision of law is applicable: "The law must be applied in all
cases which come within the letter or the spirit of any of its provisions.
Where no provision is applicable the case shall be decided according to
the local custom." ' 62 This is especially troublesome for a foreign party
52. Sathirathai & Uwanno, supra note 41, at 46.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 47.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 45.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Jayavadh Bunnag, Arbitration Law in Thailand 1 (1991) (paper presented to the To-
kyo Conference on the Harmonization of Trade and Investment Practices in the Asia-Pacific
Region 1991, on file with the Hastings International and Comparative Law Review).
61. Sathirathai & Uwanno, supra note 41, at 45.
62. Thai Civil and Commercial Code, Book I, § 4.
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because custom does figure into business law: "[C]ustom has an impor-
tant role in the areas of family and commercial laws .... [Flor example,
issues concerning trust receipt, documentary credits, [and] incoterms
have been decided upon bas[ed] on commercial practices."63 Determin-
ing the Thai commercial customs in general or in a particular region with
any precision, or predicting what a Thai court is likely to believe them to
be, is difficult at best.
Section 4 of the Civil and Commercial Code states that "general
principles of law" shall control where there is no custom: "If there is no
such custom, the case shall be decided by analogy to the provision most
nearly applicable, and, in default of such provision, by the general princi-
ples of law." 4 Thai scholars Uwanno and Sathirathai note that there are
two approaches to applying "general principles." One application defers
to a form of natural law.65 The second is "on an ad hoc basis, taking into
account the structure and nature of the laws and issues ... which the
general principles will supplement., 66 The exact meaning of the forego-
ing is far from clear, highlighting the fact that when "general principles
of law" are invoked, one can be sure the law is uncertain and
unpredictable.
Invocation of these two broad and seemingly vague provisions is not
as rare as one might initially think, due to the limited use of analogy in
Thai law: "Even Thai courts are bound to apply only the words of the
statute and cannot apply them by analogy to new cases not explicitly
covered by these [sic] words." 67 Thus, where an issue is not squarely
covered by a Code provision, a court may not analogize to a similar Code
provision, but rather must resort to custom and "general principles of
law."
5. Judicial Precedent
In a common law jurisdiction, custom, "general principles," and
broad statutory commands would not be troublesome, at least not after a
body of case law evolved lending concrete definition to the broad man-
dates. Unfortunately, judicial decisions are not a source of law in Thai-
land, nor are they binding precedent.68 The Supreme Court's decisions
have some persuasive authority, but those of the inferior courts have
63. Sathirathai & Uwanno, supra note 41, at 47.
64. Thai Civil and Commercial Code, Book I, § 4.
65. Sathirathai & Uwanno, supra note 41, at 48.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 48-49.
68. Id. at 48.
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none.6 9 The problem is complicated in that the Thai Bar Association
never publishes the inferior courts' decisions, and only periodically pub-
lishes selected Supreme Court decisions, thus impeding a researcher from
predicting the law in a given subject area."
C. Summary
Under the Thai legal system, unless an issue or situation is specifi-
cally covered by a legislative enactment, the law is uncertain. Arbitra-
tion, with its inherent flexibility, can avoid many of the Thai legal
system's problems and uncertainties through the use of a choice of law
provision and the ability to appoint business peers as arbitrators. Choice
of law provisions give the parties some certainty regarding the rules gov-
erning potential disputes. The ability to appoint business peers allows
resolutions based more on business practices and party expectations than
on the vagaries of Thai law or policy.
MII. ARBITRATION IN THAILAND: 1987 ARBITRATION
ACT, 1990 ARBITRATION RULES AND 1990
CONCILIATION RULES
On July 19, 1987, His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej pro-
claimed the enactment of the Arbitration Act.71 The Government Ga-
zette published the Act on August 12, 1987; the Act became law the
following day.7 2 Pursuant to section 4 of the Act, which charges the
Ministry of Justice with its execution, the Ministry of Justice's Arbitra-
tion Institute promulgated both the Arbitration Rules and the Concilia-
tion Rules in April 1990.73 While the Arbitration Act's provisions
govern arbitration in Thailand generally, the Arbitration Rules and Con-
ciliation Rules govern arbitration and conciliation specifically at the Min-
istry of Justice's Arbitration Institute.
Parties wishing to arbitrate in Thailand follow one of two courses:
they simply agree to arbitrate privately under the rules of the Arbitration
Act, or they agree to resolve their dispute at the Arbitration Institute
under the Arbitration Rules. The Arbitration Rules, exemplifying
subordinate legislation, generally follow the Act without contradicting it.
69. Id. at 48-49.
70. Id. at 49.
71. Preamble to Arbitration Act of B.E. 2530 (1987) (B.E. means Buddhist Era, which
precedes A.D. by 543 years).
72. Id. (published in Government Gazette, vol. 104, part 156, Aug. 12, 1987).
73. Arbitration Rules (1990) and Conciliation Rules (1990) (both published in Govern-
ment Gazette, vol. 107, part 54, April 3, 1990).
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The Arbitration Rules provide more definite procedures than the Act,
and partially restrict the parties' latitude. However, rule 4 of the Arbi-
tration Rules allows the parties to agree not to apply the Arbitration
Rules to resolution of their dispute at the Arbitration Institute.74 Pre-
sumably, the parties could also agree to pick and choose which Rules to
apply and substitute their own variations for the Rules they discard.
71
Thus, the Institute allows latitude while providing an experienced forum
to guide the parties through the process. This helps to speed up the pro-
cess. Furthermore, it ensures that the parties follow the Rules and the
Act, thus minimizing the possibility of a collateral attack on the arbitral
award based on an argument that the Arbitration Act was not correctly
followed. Because the Arbitration Institute guides parties in following
the Rules and the Act, it is also possible, although untested, that a Thai
court may be influenced to uphold an arbital award because the Arbitra-
tion Institute rendered it.
A. Preliminary Rules
7 6
A threshold determination is whether the parties entered into an
arbitration agreement. Section 5 of the Arbitration Act defines an arbi-
tration agreement as "an agreement or an arbitration clause in a contract
whereby the parties agree to submit present or future civil disputes to
arbitration... ."I While the precise meaning of "civil dispute" remains
unclear, the term certainly includes all ordinary commercial agree-
ments.7" For a binding arbitration agreement, section 6 requires that it
be written.79 Section II, rule 2 of the Arbitration Rules contains a model
clause for parties to use if they want the Arbitration Institute to resolve
their dispute using the Arbitration Rules.80 Section 10 of the Arbitration
Act allows a party to stay a court proceeding and proceed with arbitra-
74. Arbitration Rules, rule 4. The Director of the Institute must consent to a rule 4
agreement.
75. This ability to substitute is not stated in the Act. However, given the fact that the
parties can discard the Arbitration Rules and agree upon their own rules at the Arbitration
Institute, it follows that the parties can tailor the Rules to their satisfaction, so long as the
modified rules do not run afoul of the Arbitration Act.
76. The principal focus of this Note is on the Arbitration Rules. For the most part the
Arbitration Rules follow the provisions of the Arbitration Act closely. The Arbitration Act
provisions are discussed where there is no corresponding Arbitration Rule, or where the Rules
and the Act differ in some respect.
77. Arbitration Act § 5.
78. Hemarajata, supra note 22, at 49.
79. Arbitration Act § 6.
80. Arbitration Rules, rule 2.
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tion if the arbitration agreement covers the dispute."1 Before staying the
court proceeding, the court examines the arbitration agreement to deter-
mine its validity.
2
Under the Arbitration Rules, before commencing arbitration the Di-
rector of the Arbitration Institute must convene the parties to try to
reach a settlement.8 3 If the Director deems it appropriate and the parties
agree, a conciliator is appointed and conciliation is conducted under the
Conciliation Rules," which are quite flexible. Conciliation Rules 3(2)
specifically allows the parties to exclude or vary any of the Conciliation
Rules at any time. 5 Basically, under the conciliation procedure an im-
partial conciliator mediates the parties' dispute and arrives at a mutually
agreeable settlement. If the parties reach a settlement, the conciliator
drafts a settlement agreement which the parties sign. 6 If they cannot
reach a settlement, the conciliator is not eligible as an arbitrator or coun-
sel with respect to that dispute.8 7 Similarly, the conciliator is unavailable
as a witness in any subsequent arbitral or judicial proceedings.88 Fur-
ther, parties may not introduce as evidence in a subsequent judicial or
arbitral proceeding concerning the same dispute the following: (1) an
opponent's views or suggestions expressed in the conciliation proceed-
ings; (2) an opponent's admissions during such proceedings; (3) the con-
ciliator's expressed proposals or views; or (4) an opponent's willingness
to agree to a proposed settlement.8 9 The obvious intent of these rules is
to encourage parties to discuss settlement openly and freely without fear
that opponents will use such candor against them if conciliation fails and
arbitration or litigation follows.
Regardless of whether the parties agree to arbitrate their differences,
they may agree to submit their dispute to the Arbitration Institute for
conciliation. Conciliation rule 19 provides a model contract clause to
create a conciliation agreement. 90 The conciliation procedure is ideal for
parties whose differences are slight and who wish to preserve their com-
mercial relationship. Also, parties may use conciliation to test the likely
resolution of their dispute in arbitration. The conciliator's suggestions
81. Arbitration Act § 10.
82. Id.
83. Arbitration Rules, rule 3(1).
84. Id., rule 3.
85. Conciliation Rules, rule 3(2).
86. Id., rule 11(1).
87. Id., rule 17.
88. Id.
89. Id., rule 18.
90. Id., rule 19.
1992]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
generally derive from, inter alia, fairness, trade customs, and previous
practices,9 all of which an arbitrator would consider in making an award
decision.92
B. Arbitral Process
Under the Arbitration Rules, if conciliation fails, the parties begin
the arbitral process. A party may appoint anyone to assist in the arbitra-
tion,93 and the parties are free to agree on the language, or languages, in
which to conduct the arbitral proceedings.94 Furthermore, the parties
may agree to the number of arbitrators to be selected. Barring such an
agreement, the Rules specify that there will be one or three arbitrators. 95
If one is selected, either the parties agree on a particular person, 96 or the
Institute provides a list of at least three people which the parties rank in
order of preference after deleting the name of the most objectionable po-
tential arbitrator.97 When using three arbitrators, each party appoints
one and the two newly-appointed arbitrators appoint the third.98 A ma-
jority of the arbitrators decides the case.99
Under the Rules, when justifiable doubts exist as to a particular ar-
bitrator's impartiality, the non-sponsoring party may challenge the ap-
pointment.°1 A substitute arbitrator is appointed if the sponsoring party
agrees with the challenge. 01 Otherwise, the parties submit the matter to
the Arbitration Commission for determination." 2 Under the Arbitration
Act, a party must challenge an opponent's appointee in court. 103 The
permissible grounds for such a challenge are either one of the enumer-
91. Id., rule 9(2).
92. That is unless the parties have agreed to some specific choice of law provision for
arbitration.
93. Arbitration Rules, rule 9; Arbitration Act § 19.
94. Arbitration Rules, rule 20.
95. Arbitration Rules, rule 10. Under the Arbitration Act, there can be one arbitrator or
"several." When more than one is selected, each party appoints an equal number. Arbitration
Act § 11. This method is unsatisfactory because § 16 requires an award by a majority of the
arbitrators. In a deadlock situation, the parties must invoke a § 16 procedure for appointing
an umpire to break the deadlock. This potentially negates the benefit of appointing arbitrators.
Section 11 requires that where an agreement is silent as to the number of arbitrators, there will
be three-one appointed by each party and the third appointed by the two arbitrators.
96. Arbitration Rules, rule 11(5).
97. Id., rule 11(1)-(2).
98. Id., rule 12(1).
99. Id., rule 12(4).
100. Id., rule 15(1).
101. Id., rule 16(1).
102. Id., rule 17.
103. Arbitration Act § 14.
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ated grounds for challenging a judge under the Thai Civil Procedure
Code or a showing of potential prejudice to the arbitrator's
impartiality.
10 4
Both the Arbitration Act and the Arbitration Rules provide the ar-
bitrator and the parties wide discretion in tailoring the proceedings to the
special circumstances of each case. The Arbitration Act is quite broad
regarding the actual proceedings: "[U]nless otherwise provided by the
arbitration agreement or law, an arbitrator shall have power to conduct
any procedure as he deems appropriate taking the principle of natural
justice . . . [into] prime consideration." ' 5 The Arbitration Rules are
similarly broad: "[S]ubject to these Rules and the agreement between the
parties, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner
as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with
equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a full
opportunity of presenting his case.""1 6 The Rules, however, include
some specific procedures not contained in the Act. For example, rule 22
dictates the procedure for hearing evidence, though it also specifically
allows the parties to agree to a different procedure.10 7 Rule 23 requires
each party to prove the facts on which they base their claim or de-
fense.10 8 However, these specific procedural rules do not make it less
attractive to arbitrate under the Rules than under the Act, because the
Rules' proscribed provisions are quite flexible and non-constraining, and
rule 4 allows the parties to waive objectionable provisions of the Rules
with the consent of the Director. 109 An advantage to arbitration under
the Rules instead of the Act is that the Rules, with their pre-set proce-
dures, do not require the parties to either draft an extensive arbitration
agreement with elaborate arbitration procedures110 or leave the proce-
dure entirely up to the arbitrator's discretion.
The Act explicitly allows an arbitrator to invoke the power of a
court to summon witnesses, administer oaths, order submission of docu-
104. Id. § 14; Thai Civil Procedure Code of B.E. 2477 (1934) §§ 11-14 govern the chal-
lenge of judges. The grounds are: (1) the judge has an interest in the case; (2) the judge is
related to any of the parties; (3) the judge is cited as a witness or an expert in the case; (4) the
judge has been the legal representative of either party; (5) the judge acted as judge or arbitrator
in a previous phase of the same case; (6) there is a case pending between the judge or his
relatives and a party or a party's relatives; or (7) the judge is the creditor, debtor, or employer
of any of the parties.
105. Arbitration Act § 17.
106. Arbitration Rules, rule 21.
107. Id., rule 22.
108. Id., rule 23.
109. Id., rule 4(1).
110. That is unless the parties wish to devise their own elaborate procedures.
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ments or material, apply provisional measures to protect a party's inter-
ests during the arbitration proceedings, or to answer a question of law. 1
To invoke the court's power the arbitrator must file a petition with the
court to initiate the desired proceeding. 12 If the court finds that it could
execute the desired proceeding in a legal action, it grants the arbitrator's
petition. 113 By contrast, the Rules are silent as to a similar procedure.
Since the Rules are subordinate to the Act, presumably the Act's provi-
sions may be utilized in arbitration under the Rules, but the precise rela-
tionship of the Arbitration Act to the Arbitration Rules is unclear.1"4
The Act and the Rules also differ regarding the basis for the arbitra-
tor's award. While the Act is silent on appropriate basis for awards, rule
28 states: "In interpret[ing the] contract, the tribunal shall take into ac-
count its enforceability and the [trade] usages.., applicable to the trans-
action."" 5 Unlike arbitration legislation in most countries, including the
United States, both the Rules and the Act require the arbitral tribunal to
issue a decision, identifying the basis for the award. 116 This allows a
more thorough review of the award by a court.
While the Rules are silent, the Act sets forth both the means to
enforce, and the grounds for challenging, an award. Presumably, the Act
governs as it stands in superior position to the Rules. Ordinarily an
award is final and binding once the arbitrator sends a copy of the award
to the parties.' '7 However, if the losing party refuses to comply with the
award, the prevailing party must request a court judgment confirming
the award before attempting to enforce it."' During the court inquiry,
the court must give the party refusing compliance an opportunity to
challenge the request." 9 The party seeking enforcement must file the
request for confirmation within one year from the date the arbitrator sent
copies of the award to the parties. 120 Therefore, prudent parties who
desire enforcement are well-advised to automatically request confirma-
tion, regardless of their opponents' willingness to abide by the award, to
ensure that they do not lose their rights to judicial enforcement if other
111. Arbitration Act § 18.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. It is unclear when one proceeds under the Rules, whether the Act's provisions which
have no corresponding rule will apply. Since the Act is the enabling legislation for tile Rules,
the Act's provisions most likely apply when the Rules are silent.
115. Arbitration Rules, rule 28.
116. Arbitration Act § 20; Arbitration Rules, rule 29.
117. Arbitration Act § 22.





enforcement attempts take longer than a year. The drawback of auto-
matically requesting confirmation, however, is that such a procedure al-
lows judicial review of the award, raising the possibility the court will
vacate the award when the other party was willing to comply with it.
C. Vacating the Award
Section 24 of the Act allows a court to deny enforcement of an arbi-
tral award, "[i]n case[s] where the court is of the opinion that an award is
contrary to the law governing the dispute, is the result of any unjustified
act or procedure or is outside the scope of the binding arbitration agree-
ment or relief sought by the party .... ,,121 The court's judgment regard-
ing a challenge to an award cannot be appealed unless:
(1) [A party] ... alleg[es] that the arbitrator or umpire did not act in
good faith or that fraud was committed by any party;
(2) The order or judgment... [frustrates] the provisions of law gov-
erning public order;
(3) The order or judgment is not in accordance with the arbitral
award;
(4) The judge who held the [i]nquiry... [issues] a dissenting opinion
or... certifie[s] that there are reasonable grounds for appeal; or
(5) It is an order concerning the provisional measures for the protec-
tion of interests of the party pending arbitration proceedings under sec-
tion 18.122
Section 24 of the Act, which gives courts wide latitude to review
arbitral awards, resulted from a dilemma facing the Act's drafters re-
garding how to ensure that "on the one hand, the court would... [gener-
ally] respect the sanctity of the arbitral award but, on the other hand,...
arbitral awards . . . [inherently] contrary to public order [would be
struck]." 123 Exactly what the drafters considered contrary to the public
order or which criteria they anticipated using in such a factual determi-
nation is unclear. 24 The court is left to determine whether awards are
contrary to the public order on a case-by-case basis. One commentator
predicted that either the section will be narrowly interpreted, or the con-
cept of arbitration may be lost.125
Parties considering arbitration proceedings in Thailand should con-
121. Id. § 24.
122. Id. § 26. Section 18 proceedings involve resorting to the court's power to issue
injunctions.
123. Bunnag, supra note 60, at 6.
124. Id. at 6-7.
125. Id. at 6.
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cern themselves with the courts' broad power to review arbitral awards,
especially since the Act is relatively new and the courts' actual applica-
tion of section 24 remains unclear. 26 Nevertheless, parties can minimize
the courts' opportunities to vacate an award by agreeing to apply sub-
stantive law and procedural rules which are not radically contrary to
Thai law or policy. Unfortunately, taking such precautions negates arbi-
tration's beneficial aspect of allowing parties to avoid national policy con-
siderations, increases the complexity of entering an arbitration
agreement, and reduces the flexibility offered by arbitration. Thus, the
potential of a court vacating an award under section 24 adds uncertainty
and reduces arbitration's appeal and utility.
IV. ENFORCEMENT
Enforcement of a Thai arbitration award is fairly simple under the
procedure provided in section 23 of the Arbitration Act. When the party
against whom enforcement is sought lacks assets in Thailand sufficient to
satisfy the award, the 1958 New York Convention'27 provides for en-
forcement in any member country where that party has sufficient assets.
Thailand's membership status in the New York Convention is un-
clear. Thailand acceded to the New York Convention on December 21,
1959.128 However, before an international treaty becomes operative in
Thailand, the Parliament must promulgate domestic legislation in com-
pliance with the treaty.129 The Military Government promulgated do-
mestic legislation complying with the New York Convention on March
10, 1960, in the form of a domestic decree, but at the time the military
regime governed without a parliament. 3 Some legal scholars thus argue
that Thailand is not a member of the New York Convention because
Parliament never properly ratified it. 3' Although the Thai government
never acted to resolve the matter, however, the Thai courts and observers
generally accept Thailand as a member of the New York Convention and
abide by its terms.' 32
A party seeking enforcement of a Thai arbitral award in another
member country must submit to a "competent authority"'' 33 an original
126. The parties' concern with the court's broad power of review is not over the precden.
tial value of a given decision, but over the court's willingness to vacate arbitral awards.
127. New York Convention, supra note 33, art. I, § 1.




132. Id.; see also Bunnag, supra note 60, at 2.
133. New York Convention, supra note 33, art. V, § 1.
[Vol. 16
Arbitrating in Thailand
or authenticated copy of the award and the original agreement to arbi-
trate.134 If these documents are not in an official language of the mem-
ber-state, the enforcing party must provide written translations.'35 The
court may refuse to recognize and enforce the award on a number of
grounds, but the party opposing the enforcement bears the burden of
proving those grounds. 136 Thus, once the party seeking enforcement
meets a simple showing of an arbitration agreement and an arbitration
award, the New York Convention shifts the burden of proof to the party
opposing enforcement.
The Article V grounds for refusing enforcement under the New
York Convention are:
(a) Incapacity of one of the parties under the law [of the country
where the award was made];
137
(b) The agreement is invalid under the law... [selected by] the parties
... or if none [was] specified, the law of the country where the award
was made;
138
(c) The party against whom [the] award was given was not afforded
proper notice of proceedings, arbitrator, or otherwise was unable to
present his case;
139
(d) The award deals with matters beyond the scope of the arbitration
agreement;
140
(e) The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the procedure was not
in accordance with the agreement or the law of the country where the
award was given;'
4
(f) The award... [is] not yet... binding on the parties;
142
(g) The subject matter of the arbitration is not capable of settlement
by arbitration under the law of the country where enforcement is
sought;
143
(h) Recognition or enforcement of the award... [is] contrary to the
public policy of the country where enforcement is sought.'"
Although the grounds listed above indicate that a court deciding
whether to enforce an award under the New York Convention has broad
134. Id., art. IV, § 1.
135. Id., art. IV, § 2.
136. Id., art. V, § 1.
137. Id., art. V, § l(a).
138. Id.
139. Id., art. V, § l(b).
140. Id., art. V, § 1(c).
141. Id., art. V, § l(d).
142. Id., art. V, § l(e).
143. Id., art. V, § 2(a).
144. Id., art. V, § 2(b).
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authority to refuse enforcement, the enforcing party can effectively avoid
sections (a) through (f) by petitioning a Thai court to confirm the award
under section 23 of the Arbitration Act. A Thai court's confirmation
creates a prior judicial finding that the arbitration conformed either to
the laws of Thailand or to the rules agreed upon by the parties. Espe-
cially with respect to Thai law (including the Arbitration Act and Arbi-
tration Rules), foreign courts almost unfailingly defer to a Thai court's
judgment. Even as to matters not uniquely Thai (for example, rules to
which the parties stipulated in the arbitration agreement), the enforcing
court will probably defer to the Thai court's prior judicial holding either
because of comity concerns or because of especially high standards of
proof required for overturning prior judicial findings. The applicability
of sections (g) and (h), however, will depend on the enforcing country's
law. Since it is unlikely that a commercial dispute is incapable of settle-
ment by arbitration under the enforcing country's law, a section (g) at-
tack will seldom succeed. Nor is the enforcing country's "public policy"
likely to present a section (h) obstacle. Furthermore, most judicial sys-
tems' policies encourage dispute resolution by arbitration and mandate
non-interference with arbitral awards. For example, the United States'
explicit judicial policy is to construe the public policy limitation nar-
rowly. In Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Company, Limited,'45 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit noted, "[tihe public policy in favor of
international arbitration is strong .... "146 and "the 'public policy' limi-
tation on the Convention is to be construed narrowly to be applied only
where enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic notions of
morality and justice."' 47 Any award recognized by a Thai court 148 is
unlikely to violate the enforcing state's "most basic notions of morality
or justice."
The United States and Thailand signed and ratified the Treaty of
Amity and Economic Relations between the Kingdom of Thailand and
the United States of America.' 4 9 Article II, paragraph 3 provides for
mutual enforcement of arbitral awards.'50 Parties should first seek en-
forcement under the New York Convention because its provisions are
145. 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
146. Id. at 516 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Island Territory
of Curacao v. Solitron Devices Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986
(1974)).
147. Id. (citing Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie Du
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974)).
148. See procedure under Arbitration Act § 23.




more encompassing than the Treaty, but the Treaty's existence provides
a compelling argument that a United States court should enforce a Thai
arbitral award under the Convention regardless of objections made to
enforcement in the United States under sections (g) or (h).
The New York Convention makes arbitral awards more enforceable
than awards rendered by national courts. The enforceability of a Thai
arbitral award faces few obstacles and this is an advantage of resolution
by arbitration.
V. THE WORKING OF ALIENS ACI
The Working of Aliens Act B.E. 2521 (1978) prohibits non-Thai
nationals from working in certain fields and requires aliens to obtain
work permits to work in others.151 In addition to prohibiting aliens from
manual cigarette rolling, the Act also prohibits aliens from performing
thirty-eight other jobs, including any aspect of the legal profession or
litigation services.152 Thus, a non-Thai lawyer cannot render legal serv-
ices to a client in Thailand unless she obtained a work permit prior to the
Act's implementation (July 22, 1978) and qualifies to continue practicing
under the grandfather clause.'53 The Act also prohibits aliens from rep-
resenting clients in arbitration or acting as arbitrators: "As the Alien
Occupation Act is presently worded, it is not legally possible for foreign
lawyers to participate in arbitration proceedings in Thailand as legal
counsel or even as arbitrat[ors] or umpire[s] if such function involves the
interpretation of legal principles or rules as would occur in most
cases." 1
54
The Working of Aliens Act presents two important problems for
business people in Thailand. First, the Act certainly prohibits the busi-
ness person's counsel from presenting a case before an arbitral tribunal,
and if strictly construed, the business person's or a company's own coun-
sel cannot even assist or advise the client regarding Thai arbitral proceed-
ings in general. It is always advisable to retain a local attorney when
entering an international business transaction. Still, a major advantage
of arbitrating in other countries, besides Thailand, is that the business
person can use his or her own attorney, a proven litigator, or a specialist
in international arbitration as an advocate. Most business people prefer
151. Pises Sethsathira, Aliens' Work Law, 1 CHULALONGKORN L. REv 89, 89 (1982).
152. Id. at 89; Royal Decree Naming the Occupations and Professions, Forbidden to
Aliens, B.E. 2522 (1979) (published in Government Gazette, vol. 96, special issue, part 80,
May 14, 1979).
153. Bunnag, supra note 60, at 11.
154. Id. at 12.
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to use the attorney who is most familiar with their general business and
who was involved in the transaction from its beginning to at least oversee
the arbitration. Secondly, the Working of Aliens Act requires the parties
to select Thai arbitrators, reviving doubts as to national bias. Further-
more, this requirement presents a foreign business person with the diffi-
cult task of finding a Thai arbitrator who is familiar with the particular
business or type of transaction at hand, thus cancelling some of the im-
portant benefits generally derived from control over the selection of
arbitrators.
The Working of Aliens Act also applies to litigation in the Thai
national courts, preventing non-Thai counsel from. participating while
placing the decision in the hands of a Thai national. If the decision is
between submitting a dispute to Thai national courts or arbitrating, arbi-
tration is still more attractive because of other advantages of arbitration
such as flexibility, time savings, ability to choose the governing substan-
tive and procedural law, and its relatively non-adversarial nature. How-
ever, application of the Working of Aliens Act argues for locating the
arbitration in some third country if possible. If Thailand decides to pro-
mote itself as a regional arbitration center, the government may relax the
Act's prohibition of alien attorneys as it applies to arbitration. 55 How-
ever, as the law now stands, the Working of Aliens Act seriously under-
mines the attractiveness to foreign investors of arbitrating in Thailand.
VI. CONCLUSION
Arbitration is an effective and increasingly common mechanism for
resolving many international commercial disputes. Arbitration's flexibil-
ity, informality, and enforcement advantages are strong attractions for a
foreign investor. It is especially attractive in a country such as Thailand
where a foreign investor faces an unknown foreign language, culture, and
legal system. In such situations arbitration allows resolution of disputes
on a more familiar and predictable basis.
Arbitrating in Thailand is potentially an ideal compromise between
leaving dispute resolution to Thai courts and arbitrating disputes abroad.
Often one party will not agree to allow Thai courts to resolve the dispute,
or the transaction's value does not justify the cost of arbitrating over-
seas.1 56 Perhaps agreeing to resolve the dispute in Thailand would be
beneficial as a valuable goodwill gesture or where a party is unwilling to
155. Id.
156. An option not explored in this Note is to arbitrate at the relatively close Regional
Arbitration Center in Kuala Lampur, Malaysia.
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expend negotiating capital to secure the optimal mechanism for dispute
resolution. In such instances, arbitrating in Thailand is an attractive al-
ternative to submitting the dispute to the Thai courts.
However, the attraction of arbitrating in Thailand is greatly reduced
by-Thailand's present rules governing arbitration. To some degree, the
broad reviewability of arbitral awards by Thai courts returns the dispute
to the forum originally sought to be avoided. For example, the unknown
criteria to be applied in determining what is contrary to "public order"
effectively requires that the parties to an arbitration not stray far from
Thai law for fear a court will vacate their award. This defeats the pur-
pose of using a choice of law provision to remove the dispute from the
uncertain application of national law and policy. The prohibition against
aliens' participation in the arbitration process also reduces Thailand's
draw as a site for arbitration. International arbitration is highly attrac-
tive to foreign investors because of the global uniformity of its procedures
and the ability to select their own lawyers to litigate on their behalf any-
where in the world. The inability of foreign lawyers to participate in the
arbitration process in Thailand removes this attractive feature. More im-
portantly, by requiring the arbitrators to be Thai, the Working of Aliens
Act negates much of the benefit derived from the power to select arbitra-
tors by greatly reducing the pool of potential arbitrators. It also rein-
states the fear of national bias, since the dispute will be settled by Thais.
If one party refuses to resolve a dispute outside of Thailand, arbitra-
tion is still potentially more attractive than litigating in Thai national
courts. However, if arbitration's most attractive aspects are the broad
choice of law provisions and the freedom from national bias, then the
advantage derived from arbitrating in Thailand is negligible as these ben-
efits are difficult to obtain under Thai law. Thus, the decision to arbitrate
in Thailand cannot be automatic. It requires a foreign investor to specifi-
cally assess the value of the various factors and weigh the potential bene-
fits against the risks. This result is unfortunate because, with modest
reform of both the Working of Aliens Act and the courts' power of re-
view, Thailand could provide an ideal forum for arbitration and, by ex-
tension, a more attractive site for foreign investment.
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